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Baron, Roper and Baron (1974) claim that group decisions 
regarding contributions to a charitable cause sometimes represent 
generally stingier options than the options picked by individuals 
when choosing alone. Their study and interpretations are consistent 
with a sizable social psychological literature which postulate:o; 
that "choice shifts" of various kinds occur as a result of group 
decision. Theories used to explain "choice shifts" usually rest 
on principles of group decision involving concepts like cultural 
values, responsibility, leadership, etc. In the present case, for 
example, the diffusion of personal responsibility for uncharitable 
behavior was offered as one explanation for smaller mean donations 
by groups. 
Studies such as the Baron, Roper and Baron paper are a~ten:pts 
to isolate any "major limitations to one of the most basic findings 
in social psychology: convergence to the average response follmving 
group interaction" (p. 539). He argue below that the Baron, Roper 
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and Baron results are almost completely explained by a theory which 
is of substantially different tradition. Furthermore this alter-
native theory can be used to partially explain that which is of more 
fundamental concern, circumstances under which one can expect the 
generally observed convergence phenomenon and when one can expect 
deviations from it. 
1. Competing Theories 
Theories found in economics and political science tend to 
be based upon principles which appear to differ from those used in 
psychology. One widely accepted theory found in these fields which 
we apply belmv to the Baron, Roper and Baron experiments, predicts 
that groups will, under certain well-defined conditions, reach a 
1najority rule voting equilibrium when such equilibriums exist. A 
voting equilibrium is a point which can be beaten by no other point 
in a binary, majority rule contest characterized by sincere voting. 
For multi-dimensional spaces the mathematical properties of the 
equilibrium were developed by Plott (1967) and Sloss (1973). The 
theory for the one-dimensional case was first developed by Black 
(1958). 
The one-dimensional case see~s to apply without modifi-
cation to the Baron, Roper, and Baron experiment. Suppose on 
Figure 1 the points A, B, and C represent the amounts that indivi-
duals A, B and C are prepared to donate respectively to a charitable 
cause. These points are, respectively, the "individual responses." 
Suppose further the individual ordinal preferences for other 
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donation magnitudes over the dorr~in [0,10] are represented by 
the utility functions ~. UB, Uc, respectively. Notice that both 
individuals B and C prefer $3.00 to any amount less and thus would 
vote for $3.00 when put against any lesser amount. Individuals A 
and B_prefer $3.00 to any greater amount, so if $3.00 is put aga:i!nst 
anything to its right then both A and B would vote for $3.00. Thus 
$3.00 is the majority rule equilibrium since nothing can beat it 
(in this case it beats everything else). 
When preferences are "single peaked" as shown on the 
figure and there are an odd number of people, the equilibrium is 
easy to find. It is the most preferred point of the median indi-
vidual. More genera~ ly in this one-dimensional case, a point is 
an equilibrium in case one-half or less of the individual's 
maximums are on either side of the point. If there are an even 
number of people, many equilibriums may exist. If there are four 
individuals for example all points on the line segment between the 
two middle people will be equilibriums. 
Notice that according to this model of majority rule pro-
cesses the group choice has no necessary relationship at all with 
the mean. On Figure 1 the $3 equilibrium point.is considerably less 
than the $4 mean. Now suppose the most preferred point for B was 
$6 instead of $3. In this case the equilibrium would be $6 which 
is greater than the mean of $5. In fact in the three person case 
if two people have the same preference, the preference of the third, 
and thus the mean, can take any value while the equilibrium,which is 



































Under a broad class of conditions, as shown experimentally 
by Fiorina and Plott (1975) and replicated by Berl, et al. (1976), 





individual members of the group have strong, stable 
preferences over the options available to the group; 
there is no uncE!rtainty about the consequences or 
meaning of any group decision; 
there are no private deliberations among subsets of 
group members; 
there are no fixed parliamentary procedures (such as an 
agenda) other than majority rule. 
These conditions are thought to represent a set of 
sufficient conditions for the model to work. Naturally the model 
may be applicable in a broader class of circumstances as well. 
Additional experiments by Plott (1977) have extended the 
investigation to the case where a unanimity rule is substituted in 
place of the majority rule. Under unanimity Plott finds that deviations 
of group choices from the majority rule equilibrium are in the direction 
of the mean of the individuals' most preferred options. 
2. A Comparison of Conditions 
The Baron, Roper and Baron (1974) experiments meet 
almost all of the conditions above where the majority rule 
equilibrium theory is thought to apply. In their experiments 
decisions were made about donations to the Iowa Bengali Relief 
Committee. Three different items were considered: 
(a) a personal pledge, 
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(b) a university bill assesment for all students (if approved 
by a student election and providing that individuals 
could choose not to contribute), and 
(c) a student senate contribution. 
Subjects were divided into two sets defined here as 
experiments 1 and 2. For experiment 1 subjects made decisions as 
individuals on each of the three items before joining a group 
discussion and decision. For experiment 2 subjects made a group 
decision on each of the three items first and then afterwards were 
asked for their decisions as individuals. 
A comparison of the conditions under which the majority 
rule equilibrium model is thought to work with these experimental 
conditions reveals a reasonable correspondence. Student subjects 
were asked to read an article about the circumstances of Bengali 
refugees living in India at the start of the experiment, so 
subjects were not likely to be indifferent about donations. In 
the case of individual pledges they were asked to sign pledge 
cards which were, in turn, to be given to the Bengali Relief 
Committee so this decision was "re.al" in that subjects felt that 
some consequences were to be realized. Decisions regarding the 
bill assessment and the student senate contribution were hypothetical 
since nothing was to happen regardless of the subject's decisions. 
,Thus condition (i) ~have been satisfied for the individual pledge 
decision. For the other two items, (b) and (c), the question remains 
open, but the answer is probably negative. 
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Condition (ii) is intended to differentiate those cases 
where groups have a substantial "problem solving" component and 
rely upon information about decision consequences generated from 
within the group. These elements seem to be absent in the Baron, 
Roper and Baron experiments so condition (ii) was probably satisfied. 
There were no pre-meeting meetings so condition (iii) was satisfied. 
Whether or not the final and very important condition was 
satisfied is open to question. There is some ambiguity about the 
actual voting rule used by the groups. Subjects were asked to 
attempt to arrive at a unanimous decision and they were reminded 
that unanimity is different from majority rule. 1 There was also 
a three-minute time limit on the length of each deliberation2 
which imposes a parliamentar·y condition with an unknown effect. 
Since the instructions did not prohibit the use of majority rule, 
we suspect that under the circumstances it was frequently substituted 
for unanimity by those groups which came to a group decision within 
the time period. 
1The instructions read: " ... try to arrive at a unanimous decision 
on each problem. You will recognize that a unanimous decision is 
different from a majority vote." 
2rn Plott (1977) experimental groups using unanimity and under 
high payoff conditions deliberated for as long as three hours. 
Thus the critical condition (iv), which distinguishes 
between majority rule and unanimity was not tightly controlled. 
Consequently one cannot be sure whether the majority rule model 
prediction or the unanimity model prediction is the appropriate one 
to apply. In the discussion below we apply them both. 
3. Comparative Performance of Models 
We argue two points. First, the Baron, Roper and Baron 
study not only provides new support for the equilibrium theory, it 
supplies important evidence that the equilibrium model may be 
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applicable to a broader range of circumstances than has been isolated 
to date. The second conclusion is that the stingy shift reported 
by Baron, Roper and Baron is a statistical artifact. The assignment 
of individuals to .groups was such that the distribution of the group 
equilibrium "\vas skewed to the left of the mean. vfuile this second 
conclusion follows from the first, we established it independently. 
In making the comparisons below we have deleted from the 
Baron, Roper and Baron data all decisions where the group did not 
reach a single decision on the item (about 24 percent of all decisions) • 
. Neither the majority rule equilibrium nor the unanimity model make 
predictions about groups which reach no decision. Furthermore, one 
can question the relevance of these cases to the stingy shift hypo-
thesis as well. 
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3A. Overall Performances 
We will view the data from two different perspectives. 
First, we will compare the overall performance of the -two competing 
models. Secondly, we will examine those special cases where the 
two models seem to be most directly pitted against each other. 
In comparing the overall performance of the two models 
several factors must be considered. The organization of Table 1 
will help isolate them. First, many of the Baron, Roper and Baron 
groups consisted of four people. These groups frequently had 
whole sets of equilibria. In order to control for the possibility 
that any overall accuracy of the equilibrium model might be due 
to its very broad predictions, we list separately in the table 
those groups which had a single point equilibrium. Secondly, 
there are for the groups in experiment 1 sometimes differing 
measures of individual preferences. In this experiment, individual 
preference responses were recorded both before and after group 
decisions. If these two preference measures are sufficiently 
different the equilibrium will differ according to which measurement 
is used. In the table the data are evaluated with both sets of 
measurements as parameters. Thirdly, there is a question about 
whether the equilibrium prediction should be the equilibrium (as 
if the rule was majority rule) or the set pf points on the "mean 
preference" side of equilibrium (as if the rule was unanimity). 
Both predictions are recorded in the table. 
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A question remains about how one measures the relative 
accuracy of the models. We have chosen not to use parametric 
techniques3 since the basic parameters (individual preferences) 
vary substantially across groups. Accordingly we interpret the 
stingy shift model as predicting the set of points strictly less 
than the mean. A generosity shift-theory would predict that the 
groups would tend to choose some point strictly above the mean. 
A more generous interpretation of either theory might 
include the mean with the prediction. The data are avilable 
for both. 
Perhaps the best way to obtain a feeling for the compara-
tive accuracy of the equilibrium based models is from Table 1. 
on··average, across all conditions the majority rule model accounts 
3There are additional reasons why we chose to use nonparametric tests 
rather than the analysis of variance used by Baron, Roper and Baron. 
First, under the hypotheses and data we are using, all individuals 
are constrained to have the same preference under the "group choice" 
condition by virtue of coming to a group decision. This linear 
constraint among individual preference responses is not reflected 
in the structure of an analysis of variance model. For this obser-
vation we are indebted to our colleague, Forrest Nelson. Secondly, 
the fixed scales used by Baron, Roper and Baron were nonuniform. For 
example, the allowable responses were $0, $1, $2, $3, $5, $10 for the 
university bill assessment so a response of $10 could actually 
represent anything from perhaps as low as $7.50 or less. In the 
analysis of variance model such "rounding errors" lead to an asymmetric 
treatment of the groups and individuals that have high responses. 
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TABLE 1 
Groups with a Single Point Equilibrium 1 All Groups 
Experi- Type of Type of Decisior Total No. Equilibrium Models Shift Hodels Total No. 
ment No. Individual to Be Made , of Groups of Groups 
Preference by Group Which Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions w'hich Decisions pecisions Decisions Decisions 
Estimate Reached a at an at an Less Than at the Greater lll.eached a at an 1'-ess Than at Greater 
I 
Decision Equilibrium Equilibrium the Group Mean Than the Decision Equilibrium }fean Mean Than the 




No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of 
Total Total Tota1 Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Personal Pledge 7 5 71 5 71 5 I 71 0 0 2 29 4 2 50 2 50 0 0 2 50 
Pre Group 
'University Decision 12 9 75 10 83 5 42 1 8 6 50 10 8 80 4 40 1 10 5 50 
~ Preference Bill Assessment r: !contribution to 
I 
0 Estimates 
.u IBe Made by 13 9 69 11 85 4 31 2 15 7 54 11(9) 8(6) 73(67) 3 27 2 18 6 55 
c Student Senate Ql 
s . .,.., 
"" 
Personal Pledge 7 6 86 ~ 7 100 4 57 2 29 1 14 5(4) 4 (3) 80(75) 2 40 2 40 1 20 
"" 
Post Group X University t:l Decision 12 10 83 12 ·100 5 42 2 17 5 42 9 (7) 7 (5) 78(71) 3 33 2 22 4 44 
Preference Bill Assessment Contribution to Estimates Be Nade by 13 11 85 13 100 5 38. 6 46 2 15 11(5) 9(3) 82 (60)' 3 27 6 55 2 18 
Student Senate 
0 
~ Personal Pledge 7 6 86 7 100 4 57 2 29 1 14 6(4) 5 (3) 83(75) 3 50 2 33 1 17 
.u Post Group University r: Decision 10 7 70 9 90 6 60 2 20 2 20 7(5) 5(3) 71(60) 3 43 2 29 2 29 <l! Bill Assessment s Preference -.,.., Contribution to 
"" Estimates Ql Be Made by 12 12 100 12 100 2 17 7 58 3 25 10(3) 10 (3) 100(100, 2 20 7 70 1 10 
"" X Student Senate t:l 
1. All members of some groups had identical preferences. 
The data with these groups deleted are shown inside parentheses. 
Source: Table compiled from data sent to us by Baron, Roper and Baron (197~. 
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for 81 percent of the group .choices and the unanimity model accounts 
for 92 percent. The comparable figures for the stingy shift and 
generosity shift models are 46 percent and 29 percent respectively. 
The case for the equilibrium is even stronger if the median, which ' 
is perhaps a more reasonable statistic to use here, is used in 
place of the mean. In the statistics reported below the quantitative 
differences between the median and mean are so small they can be 
ignored. 
Naturally when using models that do not necessarily make 
point predictions care must be exercised. For 'this reason the 
table contains the data for those groups for which the equilbrium 
was a unique poi~t. Using these data and again comparing the accuracy 
of the equilibrium model across conditions we find that on average 77 
percent of the groups chose the unique equilibrium point. The com-
parable figures for the stingy shift and generosity shift models 
which in these cases still do not make unique point predictions, are 
37 percent and 33 percent respectively. This interpretation of 
course excludes the mean itself from the models •' predictions. 
The accuracy of the majority rule equilibrium model, when 
applied to the cases where the equilibrium is unique, can most easily 
be summarized by two sample Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests with cor-
rection for ties (Lehmann, 1975). As shown in table 2 the hypothesis 
K1 , that the majority rule equilibrium tended to be smaller than the 
group de~ision, and the hypothesis K2, that ~he majority rule equilib-
rium tended to be larger than the group decision, were both rejected 
in favor of the null hypothesis, H0 , that the decision and equilibrium 





Item and No. of K1 Against H0 K2 against H0 Preference 
Estimate Cases vl P(V ~ v1) v2 P(V ~ V2) 
Under H0 Under H0 
·a) Personal Pledge 
i) :Pre-meeting 4 3 .69 4 .62 
preference 
ii) Post-meeting 11 10 .98 11 .98 
preference 
b) University Bill 
Assesment 
i) Pre-meeting 10 18 .84 9 .96 
preference 
ii) Post-meeting 16 44 .98 14 .99 
preference 
c) Student Senate 
Contribution 
i) Pre-meeting 11 21 I .85 9 .98 
preference 
ii) Post-meeting 21 20 1.00 21 1.00 
preference 
* Vi is the Wilcoxon statistic for the data when Ki is taken against H0; 
P(V ~Vi) gives the probability of a value of the Wilcoxon statistic V 
is less than or equal to the value Vi under the null hypothesis. 
V has been corrected for the presence of the tied ranks. 
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There is an additional problem that must be considered. 
For two items, the university bill assessment and the student senate 
contribution, a fixed point scale was used: the admissible points were 
0, $1, $2, $3, $5, $10, and 0, $100, $200, $500, $1000, $2000 respec-
tively. This limited scale invites the hypothesis that the groups will 
go to the admissible point nearest to the mean. 4 Unfortunately 
predictions of this model for the two items overlap most of the time 
with the predictions of the equilibrium model. Because of the limited 
number of available points on the .scale, only a few separations of 
predictions exist. The equilibrium does perform better in the few 
cases of separation and of course, in case of personal pledge no 
such problem exists. So we are able to reject the hypothesis in favor 
of the equilibrium. 
We can freely conclude that the equilibrium model is a 
very accurate model of the groups' decisions. However, since the 
shift based models do have support in the data which is especially 
true if one adds the means as part of the models' predictions, it is 
necessary to examine in detail those groups for ~hich the theories 
come in most direct conflict. 
3B. Critical Tests 
The arguments above establish a presumption in favor of 
the equilibrium model but the fact that the models' predictions 
overlapped so frequently renders the resolution cloudy. In this 
4such a model does not always make point predictions, e.g. if the 
mean is $4 for a group's individual preferences on the university 
bill assessment item,.the model would predict either $3 or $5. 
section we examine all of the special decision situations in which 
models give unambiguously competing predictions. 
The first cases are those for which all individuals 
report identical preferences. When individuals have identical 
preferences the theories which lie behind the stingy shift model 
suggest that the group choice will be less than the individuals' 
unanimous choice. Of course we are still refining the predictions 
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of the stingy shift model to be the set of points strictly less than 
the group average. The equilibrium model on the other hand predicts 
the un~nimous choice which in this case is also the group average. 
There were two decisions out of 32 when pre-group decision preferences 
were used and 20 decisions out of 61 when post-group decision prefer-
ences were used, for which all individuals reported the same individual 
~references. The group decision was the equilibrium in 100 percent of 
these cases. Neither a stingy shift nor a generosity shift ever 
occurred. 
The second critical test occurs in the decisions for which 
the equilibrium was greater than the individuals' average. There were 
nine cases when pre-group decision preferences are used. The equilibrium 
was a unique point in all cases and in all nine cases the equilibrium 
was chosen by the group. There are ten cases to consider when post-
group preferences are used and all ten had unique equilibriums. 
Seven of the ten groups chose the equilibrium. 
Our conclusions are unambiguous. Statistical support for 
the various "shift" theories is an artifact. For the case of individual 
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pledges, the case on which Baron, Roper and Baron rest their con-
clusions, the equilibriums happen to be skewed below the mean. 
4. Conclusions 
The Baron, Roper and Baron results, as we have interpreted 
them seem to raise some interesting and fundamental questions. First, 
~heir experimental results provide important evidence that the equilib-
rium related models have applicability beyond that which previously 
has been established. Fiorina iind Plott induced subject preferences 
with monetary payoffs while Baron, Roper and· Baron used "natural 
preferences." Fiorina and Plott also used standard parliamentary 
procedures for proposing and amending motions while Baron, Roper and 
Baron evidently allowed the procedures to vary across groups. Thus 
the Baron, Roper and Baron Experiments establish the applicability 
of the equilibrium models in much more complicated environment than 
.had been previously examined. 
However, the success of the equilibrium model raises questions 
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even within the equilibrium based theories. Why, for example, should 
the majority rule model work so well when such a great emphasis was 
placed on unanimity? Perhaps the brief three minutes time limit 
coupled with low magnitude stimuli play a role. Perhaps groups sub-
stitute majority rule in such circumstances. We also noticed that 
within the groups which did not reach a single decision, there were 
often subgroups that did. The equilibriu~ model do·es a very good jo;.. 
of reflecting the choice of the subgroup when the decisions of the 
deviate members are excluded from consideration. This uniformity does 
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not follow (in any obvious way at least) from the reasoning which 
lies behind the equilibrium models. 
The success of the equilibrium model seems to raise some 
questions about the psychological literature as well. At this point 
one can call into question all theories about "shifts" in decisions. 
The equilibrium theories imply that the procedures used by groups 
impose mathematical laws over group decisions and these resulting 
laws imply that any "mean tendency" (except perhaps in the case of 
strictly enforced unanimity) is only a statistical artifact.resulting 
from ~he initial distribution of preferences. This importance of 
procedures, especially the agenda, is also demonstrated in the work 
of Levine and Plott (forthcoming). We did notice, however, that in 
case of personal pledges and student senate contribution items, the 
_group choice tended to be on the low end of the set of equilibriums 
when the latter were not unique. Within the equilibriums a "shift" 




Baron, R.S.; Roper, G.; and Baron, P.R. "Group Discussion and the 
Stingy Shift." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
30(4) (1974): 538-45. 
Berl, J.E.; McKelvey, R.D.; Ordeshook, P.C.; and Winer, M.D. 
"An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person 
Cooperative Nonsidepayment Game." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 20(3) (September 1976): 453-79. 
Black, D. The Theory of Conunittee and Elections. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958. 
Fiorina, M.P. and Plott, C.R. "Conunittee Decisions under Majority 
Rule: An Experimental Study." American Political Science 
Review, in press. 
Lehmann, E.L. Nonparametrics: Statistical Methods Based on Ranks. 
San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1975, pp. 120-45. 
Levine, M.E. and Plott, C.R. "Agenda Influence and Its Implications." 
Virginia Law Review, in press. 
19 
Plott, C.R. "A Notion of Equilibrium and the Possibility under 
Majority Rule." American Economic Review 57 (September 
1967): 797-806. 
Plott, C.R. "An Experimental Comparison of Committees Operating 
under Unanimity and under Majority Rule." Mimeographed. 
Pasadena, California: California Institute of Technology. 
Plott, C.R. and Levine, M.E. "A Model of Agenda Influence on 
Conunittee Decisions." American Economic Review, in press. 
Sloss, J. "Stable Outcomes in }1ajority Voting Games." Public Choice 
15 (1973): 19-48. 
